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the first decision under this regulation. The Commission has therefore
initiated a GATT consultation and dispute settlement procedure with the
United States under article XXiii of the GATT. 39 The essence of the
complaint is that § 337 in this case produced discriminatory treatment of
imports relative to domestic United States production in the matter of
alleged infringements of United States patents.
39. [1987] O.J.L. 117/18, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 117) 18 (1987); IP Press Release
89 (1987).

Switzerland*
Until now, Switzerland has had no blue-sky legislation of any kind, and
consequently no public authority to protect what, in the United States,
is referred to as the "integrity" of capital markets. In matters of mergers
and acquisitions in particular, ,large-scale manipulations were rife up to
quite recent times, affecting both the market as such and the underlying
corporate decisions. Insider trading may seem to be a peccadillo in such
an ambience.
Attention was, however, first directed to the latter form of misconduct
by some extraterritorial consequences of investigations by the U.S. authorities of insider trading on U.S. markets that appeared to originate in
Switzerland. Swiss authorities were precluded from cooperating in such
inquiries, since a local law prerequisite for such judicial assistance was
that the act complained of be criminal under Swiss law also (the so-called
"double criminality" requirement). U.S. courts and authorities tried to
use indirect compulsion to obtain such information by putting pressure
on affiliates or branches of Swiss banks, thereby creating an unpleasant
atmosphere between the governments concerned.
The obvious solution was to make insider trading a criminal offense in
Switzerland, so that the Treaty between the two countries for exchange
of information in criminal matters could operate smoothly in this area.
Public opinion, however, was not then prepared to take such a stern view
of misconduct in securities matters. Thus, in 1982 the two governments
worked out a provisional and informal arrangement, The Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU),I under which the Association of Swiss Bankers
*Prepared by Pierre de Charmant, partner in the law firm of Borel, Barbey, de Charmant
& Dunant, Geneva, Switzerland, with the assistance in the preparation of this article of
Nicolas Killen, of this firm.
I. Memorandum of Understanding on Insider Trading, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)

1737 (Oct. 8, 1982) [hereinafter MOU].
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set up a "voluntary" procedure (Convention XVI) to which all Swiss
banks were persuaded to adhere.
In the 1982 MOU, Switzerland made it clear that the solution provided
by Convention XVI 2 ought to be temporary. Fully aware that insider
trading was not yet punishable per se under Swiss law (although the
Tribunal federal, Switzerland's Supreme Court, lately asserted the opposite opinion in some famous but disputed decisions 3), Switzerland specified: "as the Swiss Federal Council (i.e., the federal government) will
submit to the parliament a bill on the misuse of inside information, this
4
lacuna could be filled.''

In November 1983 a first bill on the misuse of confidential information
was released by the Swiss Justice Department for consultation. It provided for both civil and criminal sanctions, and aroused strong opposition
to the provisions calling for disgorging to the company all the profits gained
by the misuse of the confidential information. These provisions have,
therefore, been removed. In final form the Bill calls for criminal sanctions
only.
I. The New Bil
The Swiss Federal Council proposes to add to the Swiss Criminal Code
the following article 161:5
1. Whoever, in a capacity as a member of the board, an officer, an auditor or
a mandatary of a company, or of a company that controls or is controlled
by the latter
in a capacity as a member of a public authority or a public officer
or in a capacity as an assistant to any of them
knows a confidential fact, disclosure of which is of a nature notably to
influence the market price of shares, securities or other instruments of such
company, or notably to influence the market price of options on such shares,
securities or instruments, traded either on a Swiss exchange or over the
counter, and obtains for himself or for a third party a pecuniary profit by
using this information

2. Agreement respecting Inside Information, August 31, 1982, United States - Switzerland, Convention XVI.
3. Sante Fe 1, RO 1983 (Jan. 26, 1983), reprintedin I.L.M. 785 (1985); Antonin & Consorts,
nonofficially published, but reprinted in Colloque, infra note 17, at 308; Santa Fe 11, nonofficially published (May 16, 1984) but reprinted in I.L.M. 745-61 (May 1985).
4. MOU, supra no. I, paragraph 111/7.

5. Swiss bill on the misuse of inside information, in Message du Conseil Fddral concernant law modification de Code P6nal (operations d'inities), May 1, 1985 [hereinafter

Message].
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or discloses such a fact to a third party and, by doing so, obtains for himself
or for a third party a pecuniary profit
shall be punished by imprisonment or a fine.
2. Whoever, being a person to whom such a fact is disclosed, directly or indirectly, by one of the persons described under (1), and who, by using such
information, obtains for himself or for a third party a pecuniary profit, shall
be punished by imprisonment up to one year or a fine.
3. When a combination between two companies is being considered, (1) and
(2) shall apply to both companies.

The first condition required is the knowledge of a confidential fact the
disclosure of which is "of a nature notably to influence the market price"
of a given stock. The Message, i.e., the explanation of the Bill given by
the Swiss Federal Council to Parliament, mentions a few examples: a
planned merger or tender offer, a prospective real estate or other important business operation, impending losses, etc. The meaning of the adverb
"notably" remains, however, quite vague: a market fluctuation is "notable" when exceptional, as opposed to a normal one. 6 Case law will have
to refine this notion further.
The second element of the misdemeanor is to obtain a pecuniary gain.
This notion of profit includes of course an avoided lOSS. 7 The Message
makes it clear that the profit gained must be in connection with the misuse
of the confidential information. 8
Insiders subject to prosecution are specifically named in article 161(1)
as members of the board, officers, auditors, mandataries of the company,
members of a public authority, or assistants of any of them. This includes
lawyers and accountants (as mandataries) and junor employees
(assistants). 9
The tippee is also subject to prosecution under article 161(2). By using
the terms "directly or indirectly," the provision enables the prosecutor
to reach not only the tipper in immediate relationship with the insider,
but also any other along the chain. To be considered as a tippee, the third
party must have known that the information was originally unlawfully
disclosed by an insider. Therefore, the third party who accidentally learns
about confidential facts and then uses such information to make a profit
or passes it on will not be punishable under Swiss law. 10

6. Id. at 14.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
The typical example of a third party not prosecutable under art. 162(2) would be the

taxi driver who learns the information from clients discussing in his car.
VOL. 21, NO. 4
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The insider shall be punished by imprisonment of up to three years or
a fine up to Sw. Fr. 40,000.11 The tippee shall be punished by imprisonment
of up to one year, or be fined as the insider. 12 In both situations, never13
theless, the fine may be unlimited if the offender acted out of greed.
Such a disposition is quite peculiar in a case of insider trading. In addition,
the judge may seize the profit realized in violation of article 161 and
allocate it to the victim. 14 For the moment, however, no one has been
able to determine precisely who the victim is and what the victim's rights
should be.
U. Comparison of the Two Systems
If Switzerland enacts its bill into law, the United States will obtain
international assistance from the Swiss authorities under the Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 197715 in all situations in which
the United States would be able to match a punishable behavior under its
own law with a behavior that would also give rise to prosecution under
Swiss law. This comparison of the Swiss and the American law on insider
trading is based on the Swiss bill on the one hand, 1 6 and current American
law on the other hand, 17 and examines how both systems deal with the
most prevalent insider practices. ' 8 Such a method shall determine in which
cases mutual assistance will in most probability be granted to the United
States.

A.

COMPARISON

1. Directors and Officers: Both American law and the Swiss bill impose
sanctions on these "classical insiders."
2. Employees of the Corporation:They are covered by insider trading
laws in the United States if inside information is acquired in the course
of their employment. The Swiss bill reaches the same result by listing as
an insider the assistant of a classical insider.
3. ControllingShareholders:Under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act a ten
percent shareholder is considered as a statutory insider. Under section
il. Code p(nal suisse (Cp) arts. 48(l).101, 161(1).
12. Id. art. 161(2).
13. Id. art. 48(2).
14. Id. arts. 58(1), 60.
15. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, January 23, 1977, United States Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2018, T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
16. See supra note 5.
17. See Hawes, Insider Trading Law in the U.S. Today-Courts and Congressin Complex
Confusion, Ltudes Suisse de Droit Europten, Colloque International, L'avant projet de la
loi frdrale sur les operations d'inities, Georg Geneva, 184, 196 (1984) [hereinafter Colloque].
18. Those practices have been listed in id. at 202.
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20 of the same Act a "controlling person" may be held derivatively liable
for the acts of others who are direct violators of rule lOb-5 or section
14(e). This derivative liability does not extend, however, to criminal liability. The controlling shareholders are not listed as insiders in the Swiss
bill and will not, as such, be prosecutable under Swiss law. 19
4. Accountants, Lawyers, Investment Bankers, and Consultants: With
its footnote 14 in Dirks, the United States Supreme Court made it clear
that these persons fall within the category of "quasi-" or "temporary"
insiders. If they qualify as mandataries under Swiss law, which will mostly
be the case, they will also be subject to prosecution under Swiss law.
5. Tippers and Tippees: In the United States the tipper must be found
to have made a personal benefit (i.e., a profit, direct or indirect, or a
reputational gain). In the Swiss bill the tipper must realize a "pecuniary"
profit for himself or for a third party by disclosing the information. Even
if the Swiss bill speaks of "pecuniary" advantage, the tipper who discloses
the information to a third party, who makes the monetary gain, will be
prosecutable. Although using different terms, both systems come to a
similar result.
Under American law, tippees will not be subject to sanctions unless
they knew or should have known that the tipper had breached his fiduciary
duty. The Swiss bill follows exactly the same reasoning: the tippee will
be prosecutable if he knew or should have known that the information
was first unlawfully disclosed by an insider.
6. Tender Offer: American law allows an acquiring company to trade
in shares of a target company prior to the publication of a tender offer,
but does not allow the company to tip a friendly purchaser with its plan
to make a tender offer. The Swiss bill does not address these practices,
but if a company other than the acquiring company trades in shares or a
liable for the
target company, its officers and directors may be criminally
20
insider trading committed by such other company.
7. "Outside Employees": The situation of an outside employee (i.e.,
an employee who has no relationship with the issuer), who breaches a
duty to his employer by trading in shares of another company, is not very

19. It is particularly difficult for a civil law practitioner to understand a provision such
as § 10(b) that is merely a grant of power to the SEC. In the Swiss system, under the

principle of legality (principe de la ldgalitd), an unlawful conduct shall be described in the
law itself, and such a delegation of power to an agency to define the wrongful conduct would
be inadmissible. While some room can be found in administrative or civil matters, the
principle is absolute in criminal law (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and is contained

in CP art. I.
20. The corporation itself may not be criminally liable under Swiss law, but the persons
acting in its name (i.e., officers, members of the board) are prosecutable in a limited number

of cases, including insider trading, that are listed under Cp art. 172.
VOL. 21, NO. 4
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well settled in the United States today, the Wall Street Journalcase having
been appealed to the Supreme Court. Apart from cases involving clear
misappropriation of information, it remains uncertain whether rule
lOb-5 shall be applied to a security analyst, a financial writer, or other
kind of outside employee trading on information lawfully obtained but not
yet made public. The Swiss bill makes no attempt to reach such persons.
I. Reaction to the New Bill in Switzerland
Many Swiss commentators and scholars have criticized the new bill on
insider trading. It is described very often as a foreign body in the Swiss
legal system. 21 Insider trading undoubtedly is considered by everyone as
dishonorable. Nevertheless, there is at the present time no unanimous
opinion that it should become a crime under the Swiss Criminal Code.
The critics focus mainly on the following arguments.
To justify a new criminal provision, it is necessary to know what kind
of legal value it is destined to protect. The Swiss Criminal Code is constructed in such a way that all offenses are classified by titles, each title
being designed to protect a particular legal value (for example: crimes
against life and corporal integrity, crimes against patrimony, etc.). Article
161 will be inserted among the crimes against patrimony, along with theft,
robbery, or fraud. This category of crimes requires that a victim sustain
an actual or potential damage. As far as insider trading is concerned, it
is somewhat harder to find a victim or to establish a damage. The unfair
advantage of the one person trading on inside information is clear, but
the loss of the myriad other participants of the market, who will find the
market has already reacted to the information by the time it is made public,
is more diffuse and difficult to apprehend.
23
Some Swiss scholars 22 have even joined some American professors
in defending insider trading from an economic point of view. Regarding
the stock market as an information exchange that places market value on
information, the insider, who trades on the basis of confidential information, does nothing but dilute the information into the market. Therefore, the information is received on a continuous basis and the market
price will change step by step without a huge leap, as after a public
announcement of a merger, for instance.
The third major argument against the bill is the lack of a true and urgent
social need or demand for it in the present state of Swiss society. 24 This,
21. Colloque, supra note 17, at 75-77; Markus Schuppisser,

FINANZ UND WIRTSCHAFT,

No. 49 (June 26, 1985).
22. Id. (the Swiss bill on insider trading).

23. Id. (insider trading in the U.,S. today).
24. Message, supra note 5, at 12.
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of course, is partially true. In the absence of a comprehensive system of
regulation of securities markets criminalizing major market manipulations,
prescribing standards of disclosure, and indeed setting up some central
organization to oversee the adherence to the standards, repression of what
is, after all, a minor affront to market integrity, may appear out of place.
One may, however, sense a change of mentality on the entire issue.
This change is manifested not only by wider public reprobation of insider
trading after the recent flagrant cases in the St. Joes and Santa Fe affairs,
but by an increasing restraint among the major actors of the financial
scene on engaging in the high-handed market action common a decade
or two ago. With the increasing globalization of securities markets, Switzerland is thus beginning a process that may facilitate its inevitable participation in the global scheme of market regulation.
In the meantime, some commentators worry how, without some central
agency such as the SEC, the new Swiss provision will be enforced with
25
the sole skills of the ordinary cantonal prosecution offices and courts.
To this, one may answer that from the point of view of its drafting techniques, the new article fits very well into the Swiss Criminal Code. Its
language is simple and concise, with just enough leeway for judicial appreciation and elaboration. There is no reason to apprehend that it will
create novel or insurmountable problems of application. Finally, some
opponents have touched upon a nationalistic chord. To them, the bill has
its origin solely in the desire of the Federal Council to please a foreign
country. These opponents have branded the provision a "Rex Ameri26
cana," the adoption of which would undermine Swiss sovereignty.
IV. Near Future
Despite all these objections, the project is now on its way and is supported by major political parties, 27 the Swiss Bankers Association, 2 8 the
press, 29 as well as other professional associations. 30 The Senate has already given its approval to the bill, which should be discussed by the
House of Representatives during spring or summer of 1987. Almost certainly, Parliament in the final analysis will adopt the bill, although perhaps
with some changes.

25.
26.
27.
28.
tung,
29.
at 18.
30.

Id. at 7.
See Markus Schuppisser, supra note 21.
Message, supra note 5,at 7-9.
Das Interesse Der Banken an der Loesung des Insiderproblems, Neue Zurcher ZeiFeb. 4, 1986, at 19.
Problematische neue Insider-Strafgesetzgebung, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Oct. 10, 1985,
Message, supra note 5, at 8.
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If the Swiss bill passes into law, the SEC, in seeking to obtain information from Swiss banks, will merely have to comply with the 1977 Exchange of Information Treaty for information to become available in a
majority of insider trading situations. A comparison of the Swiss bill and
the American law on insider trading shows, however, that some insider
trading practices will still remain free from any sanctions under Swiss law
and, therefore, not capable of putting the information exchange process
into motion.
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